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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, merchants with customers in more than one state have
relied on the relatively simple rule that sales and use1 taxes only need
* Attorney in private practice. BA, University of California at Berkeley; JD,
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to be collected and remitted on sales to customers in states where the
merchant has an office, a storefront, employees or some other physical
presence.2
This rule had its origin in two pre-Internet Supreme Court
decisions: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of
Revenue3 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.4 In Bellas Hess, the Court
held that the Commerce and Due Process Clauses prohibit states from
imposing use tax collection obligations on businesses that do not have
a physical presence in the taxing state.5 Twenty-five years later, Quill
clarified that it is the Commerce Clause, not the Due Process Clause,
that requires physical presence in the taxing state.6
These cases were decided in the twentieth century. In the new
millennium, the Internet has made it considerably easier to conduct
cross-border sales without setting foot in another state. Ecommerce
has grown exponentially. 7 By selling products and services online
instead of establishing physical storefronts or hiring salespeople in
different states, many ecommerce businesses have been able to avoid
liability for taxes in every state except the one in which the company
is physically located. This has resulted in severe revenue shortfalls for
states and municipalities.8
1. Sales and use taxes are taxes on consumption. In theory, they are taxes on
purchasers. Most states require merchants to collect and remit them on behalf of
purchasers, though. Sales taxes are taxes on transactions. Use taxes are taxes on a
buyer’s use of a purchased product. In practice, they are functionally equivalent,
with sales taxes being imposed on in-state purchases and use taxes being imposed
on purchases from out-of-state vendors. See Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty,
118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 151–57 (2015).
2. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02 (3d ed.
2017) (describing the history of the Court’s nexus requirement).
3. 386 U.S. 753 (1967)
4. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
5. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
6. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308, 317–18 (1992).
7. In 1992, less than 2% of Americans had Internet access, and all forms of
remote sales in the United States, including mail-order, totaled $180 billion. Today
89% of the population has Internet access and e-commerce retail sales amount to
approximately $453.5 billion per year. Since the beginning of the millennium, ecommerce sales have increased from 0.8% to 8.9% of total retail sales in the United
States. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018).
8. As of 2017, states were losing up to 33 billion dollars in sales tax revenues
annually as a result of the physical presence rule. Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-18-114, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: SALES TAXES,
STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED AUTHORITY, BUT BUSINESSES ARE
LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 5 (2017).
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Several states responded to revenue shortfalls by expanding their
tax bases to include services and/or digital products, 9 enacting
“affiliate nexus” tax laws,10 treating cookies on a person’s computer
as a “physical presence” in the computer owner’s state, 11 and
imposing tax obligations on online service providers (such as
Amazon, Shopify, or Etsy) that facilitate other vendors’ sales. 12
Another common approach has been to require out-of-state retailers
to report untaxed sales, to notify buyers of the obligation to pay use
taxes, or both.13
Other states took a bolder approach. They deliberately imposed
use tax collection obligations on out-of-state sellers with no physical
presence in the state, hoping to provoke a constitutional challenge that
would give the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to
overrule Bellas Hess and Quill. 14 South Dakota was one of these
states. It required an out-of-state seller, whether it was physically
present in the state or not, to collect and remit use tax if the seller
either delivered more than $100,000 of goods or services into the state
or conducted 200 or more transactions for the delivery of goods or
services into the state.15
The strategy was successful. Wayfair, Inc. and other large Internet
retailers with no physical presence in South Dakota refused to collect
the tax. South Dakota courts declared the law unconstitutional and the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider the physical
9. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32b-3 (West 2018) (taxing digital
downloads).
10. Sometimes called “click-through nexus” or “Amazon laws,” these statutes
deem a vendor to be physically present in a state if a resident of the state receives a
payment whenever a sale by the vendor results from a customer clicking on a link
to the vendor’s product or website that the resident has placed on his or her website.
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2018). Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington have enacted
similar laws. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, The History of Internet Sales Taxes from
1789 to the Present Day: South Dakota v. Wayfair, 2017-2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
269, 292 n.90. For another kind of “Amazon law,” see note 12 and accompanying
text.
11. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(I)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2018); 830
MASS. CODE REGS. § 64H.1.7(1)(b) (2018).
12. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5044 (2019). For another kind of
Amazon law, see note 10.
13. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112 (2018).
14. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088–89 (2018).
15. S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assembly, 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
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presence requirement. 16 Finding Quill to have been “flawed on its
own terms,”17 the Court overruled Bellas Hess and Quill to the extent
they prohibited states from imposing tax obligations on merchants
without a physical presence in the state. The decision, South Dakota
v. Wayfair, Inc., established that a state may impose tax obligations
on a business if it has an “economic nexus” with the state even if it
has no physical presence there.18
The elimination of the physical presence requirement created
a great deal of uncertainty. Language in Wayfair seemed to suggest
that physical presence, large sales volume, or large revenues are
needed to establish the requisite nexus with a state for tax purposes.19
States therefore scrambled to enact volume- and revenue-based use
tax thresholds. 20 Unfortunately, volume and revenue thresholds are
not a great improvement over the physical presence standard. They
are vulnerable to the same kinds of criticisms. A better solution is
needed.
II. THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Constitution gives Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce
. . . among the several States.”21 Known as the Commerce Clause, this
provision was intended “to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” 22
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to mean that states
may neither discriminate against interstate commerce 23 nor unduly
burden it. 24 Together, these implied limitations on state power
16. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.
17. Id. at 2092.
18. Id. at 2099
19. Id.
20. Sarah Horn, Jill McNally & Rebecca Newton-Clarke, How States
Responded to South Dakota v. Wayfair in 2018, THOMSON-REUTERS (Dec. 21,
2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/how-states-responded-to-south-dakotav-wayfair-in-2018/
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979).
23. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005).
24. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (State laws that
“regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be
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comprise what is known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause.25
The theory of an implied “dormant” Commerce Clause has been
the subject of a fair amount of criticism.26 The premise upon which it
rests, though, seems sound: if the country is to function as one nation,
then individual states cannot try to isolate themselves economically.
Although Wayfair upheld a state’s imposition of use tax collection
obligations on interstate sellers, the Court did not repudiate the
doctrine. To the contrary, by applying the four-prong test articulated
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady27 for assessing the validity of
sales and use taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court
reaffirmed it.
The four-prong Complete Auto Transit test requires state sales and
use taxes to
(a) not discriminate against interstate commerce;
(b) be fairly apportioned;
(c) be fairly related to the services the State provides; and
(d) apply only to activities having a substantial nexus with the
taxing State.28
1. Nondiscrimination
Nondiscrimination is central to the principle of federalism

upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits”); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, 779 (1945).
25. The phrase probably comes from Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden, in which he wrote that the power to regulate interstate commerce
“can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands
of agents, or lie dormant.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824).
26. Justice Scalia took the position that discrimination is prohibited by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, not the Commerce Clause. Tyler Pipe Indus. v.
Wash. Dep’t of Revenue 483 U.S. 232, 264 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Under this view, nothing in the Constitution would protect
businesses from discriminatory taxes. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, by its
terms, only protects citizens. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Business entities are not
citizens. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 658 (1981); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 176–77 (1868); cf.
Adam Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach To Nexus Under The Dormant Commerce
Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. 101, 116 (2018) (arguing that the “nexus” prong of the
dormant Commerce Clause should be abolished because it is subsumed under the
“fair apportionment” and “relationship to services” prongs of the Complete Auto
Transit test).
27. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
28. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279.(1977).
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underlying the dormant Commerce Clause.
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation,
which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to
control of the economy, including the vital power of
erecting customs barriers against foreign competition,
has as its corollary that the states are not separable
economic units . . . “[W]hat is ultimate is the principle
that one state, in its dealings with another, may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation.”29
For this reason, “where simple economic protectionism is effected
by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been
erected.”30 As applied to state sales and use taxes, this means that a
state may not apply higher tax rates to interstate sales than to intrastate
sales.31
2. Undue Burden
Discrimination is not the end of the inquiry. A state law that is
nondiscriminatory on its face may nevertheless run afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 32 The three other prongs of the Complete Auto Transit
test—fair apportionment, relationship to state-provided services, and
nexus— are tools for determining whether a burden on interstate
commerce is undue or not.
“Fair apportionment” means state taxes on interstate commerce
must be apportioned to reflect the taxpayer's activities in the taxing

29. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949)
(quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
30. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005); H. P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533;
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403–06 (1948); Baldwin., 294 U.S. at 511; Buck
v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925).
31. George M. Johnson, State Sales Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 24
CALIF. L. REV. 155, 165 (1936).
32. State laws that “regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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jurisdiction. 33 Multiple or duplicative taxes unduly burden
commerce.34 Each state should tax only the portion of the tax base that
reflects the taxpayer’s activities in the state.35 This advances the goal
of nondiscrimination against interstate commerce by preventing
multiple taxation of interstate commerce, a burden that is not borne
equally by wholly intrastate commerce. 36 The “fair apportionment”
requirement also ensures that states tax only those activities or values
that have a substantial nexus with the state.37
The third prong of the Complete Auto Transit test requires taxes
to be reasonably related to services or benefits the taxing authority
provides the taxpayer.38 Retailers with a physical presence in a state
meet this requirement because they benefit from state-provided
services like police and fire protection, roads and so on. Some kinds
of services benefit all retailers, whether they have a physical presence
in the state or not. These include things like courts for the collection
of the purchase price from customers, 39 sound local banking
institutions to support credit transactions, 40 and commercial and
consumer protection laws that create a climate of consumer
confidence inuring to the benefit of merchants.41 Sales and use taxes
help sustain the market to which merchants sell goods and services.42
33. See, e.g., Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 217, 217–19 (1891);
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891). Unfairly
apportioned taxes also raise Due Process Clause issues. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290
U.S. 158 (1933); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919); Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
34. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on
Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 57 (1987).
35. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the
Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 150
(2002). Fair apportionment is determined by internal consistency. In other words, if
imposing the tax in every jurisdiction would result in more than 100% of the tax
base (e.g., the sale price of a product), then the tax is not fairly apportioned. See,
e.g., Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
36. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1938).
See generally Hellerstein, supra note 34.
37. Joondeph, supra note 35, at 151.
38. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
39. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 (1992) (White, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (“Taxes . . .
are essential to create and secure the active market they supply with goods and
services.”).
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a. The Physical Presence Requirement
The fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test is “nexus.” A
tax must be “apportioned to local activities within the taxing State
forming sufficient nexus to support the tax.”43
The “substantial nexus” prong of the Complete Auto Transit test
seems to be grounded more in the Due Process Clause than the
Commerce Clause. 44 In reaching the conclusion that both Clauses
prohibit the imposition of tax collection obligations on out-of-state
sellers with no physical presence in the state, the Bellas Hess Court
drew no distinction between the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause insofar as the “nexus” requirement was
concerned.45 The Court later clarified, in Quill, that the Due Process
and Commerce Clause “nexus” requirements are not identical.
Physical presence is not required for Due Process nexus, but it is
required for Commerce Clause nexus.46
The physical presence of a person or property in a state creates a
substantial nexus to the state because states provide protection and
services to the people and property that are located within their
territorial boundaries.47 In fairness, a company or property owner that
receives state-provided benefits and protections should expect to be
required to contribute to their cost. The Quill Court went further,
holding that physical presence was not only a sufficient basis for
imposing sales and use taxes; it was a necessary condition for the
imposition of a tax collection obligation.48 The Court reasoned that if
states could impose tax obligations on out-of-state merchants, then
merchants who sell their products or services throughout the country
could be subjected to collection obligations in thousands of different
taxing jurisdictions.49 This, the Court believed, would unduly burden
interstate commerce.50
The Wayfair Court rejected the notion that physical presence is
necessary to establish the requisite nexus for either Due Process or
43. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 285.
44. Quill, 504 U.S. at 327 (White, J., dissenting); Complete Auto Transit, 430
U.S. at 281–82, 285.
45. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
46. Quill, 504 U.S., at 307–08, 311, 317–18 (majority opinion).
47. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S at 757; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S.
359, 365 (1941)
48. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 313 n.6.
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Commerce Clause purposes.51 The burden of compliance with a tax
obligation, the Court observed, is largely unrelated to whether a
company has a physical presence in a state or not.52 “The physical
presence rule is a poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by
companies that do business in multiple States.”53
This is a valid point. Some examples will help bring the problem
into sharper relief. (For the sake of simplicity, assume compliance
costs of $20 per state.)
(a) Artemis.com, an online merchant, has a thousand
employees and salespersons in New Hampshire but has
no physical presence in any other state. Each year it
makes over 1,000,000 sales to residents of other states.
Because New Hampshire has no sales or use tax, and
because Artemis.com has no physical presence in any
other state, the physical presence requirement results
in zero compliance costs for the company.
(b) Ma & Pa Kettle Co. is a small local retailer that has
decided to start selling to customers in other states. To
that end, it enters into a contract with one individual in
each state under which the individual will receive a
commission on sales made to residents of that state.
Each salesperson ends up making one $20 sale. If
physical presence alone is determinative of nexus, then
each of those states could require Kettle Co. to register
with the state and to collect and remit use taxes.
Compliance costs will put Kettle Co. out of business.
The physical presence test also harms wholly local businesses.
Exempting interstate retailers from sales and use tax obligations while
requiring wholly intrastate retailers to comply with those obligations
puts intrastate retailers at a competitive disadvantage.54 Further, the
rule distorts the operation of markets, giving companies an incentive
to avoid establishing storefronts and distribution centers, or to hire
51. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
52. Id. at 2093.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2094 (“In effect, Quill has come to serve as a judicially created tax
shelter for businesses that decide to limit their physical presence and still sell their
goods and services to a State’s consumers—something that has become easier and
more prevalent as technology has advanced.”)
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employees in different states.55 This makes little sense, inasmuch as
physical and virtual presence are functionally indistinguishable. In
fact, “[a] virtual showroom can show far more inventory, in far more
detail, and with greater opportunities for consumer and seller
interaction than might be possible for local stores.”56
b. Economic Nexus
For all these reasons, it was reasonable for the Wayfair Court to
discard the physical presence requirement. It raised a difficult
question, though: If physical presence is not the requisite nexus, then
what is? The Court would not say. Refusing to establish another
bright-line test, the Court was only willing to commit to the
proposition that “a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or
collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on
business’ in that jurisdiction.”57 The Court asserted that the volume of
sales or revenue specified in the statute and alleged in the case before
it “could not have occurred unless the seller had availed itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.”58 The
South Dakota legislature had imposed tax collection and remission
obligations on out-of-state sellers who deliver goods or services in an
amount greater than $100,000 into the State or who engage in 200 or
more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into
the State. 59 Despite the Court’s express disavowal of any intent to
establish another bright-line test for nexus,60 state taxing authorities
have interpreted the decision as establishing a sales volume threshold
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2095.
57. Id. at 2099 (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11
(2009)).
58. Id.
59. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2016). The statute was enacted pursuant
to an “[a]ct to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers,
to establish certain Legislative findings, and to declare an emergency.” S. 106,
20156 Leg. Assembly, 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). Evidently the South Dakota
legislature perceived the collection of sales taxes from out-of-state sellers as an
emergency.
60. South Dakota had not sought to impose a tax obligation on low-volume
out-of-state merchants. Consequently, it was not necessary for the Wayfair Court to
address the question whether sales volume thresholds are necessary. “Because the
Quill physical presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues
have not yet been litigated or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here.”
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2019.

Fall 2019]

James

43

for the taxation of out-of-state businesses. Several have already
enacted laws specifying sales volume and/or dollar amount thresholds
identical or very similar to South Dakota’s.61
The idea that large sales volume and/or revenue are necessary to
establish nexus may stem from the Court’s consistent use of the word
substantial as a modifier of nexus. 62 The Court has also used
substantial as a modifier of privilege of carrying on business.63 To
many people, substantial means a large amount. Substantial can also
mean real or essential. Using the term as a modifier of privilege rather
than business in the phrase privilege of doing business in a state
suggests the Court meant to use the term in the latter sense.
Eschewing the judicial establishment of a volume or revenue
threshold for tax nexus also comports with separation of powers
doctrine. Courts do not have legislative power. That power is vested
in Congress. 64 As one commentator has observed, “A decision
establishing quantitative measures to determine when ‘substantial
nexus’ exists . . . encroaches on the legislative responsibilities of
Congress or the sovereign authority of state governments.”65
The Court used the volume of sales in the case before it as
circumstantial evidence of purposeful availment, 66 but it did not
indicate that this was the only possible kind of evidence of purposeful
availment. 67 If there is direct evidence of purposeful availment in
61. Horn, McNally & Newton-Clarke, supra note 20.
62. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
63. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
64. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1; see also John Harrison, Legislative Power and
Judicial Power, 31 CONST. COMMENT 295, 299 (2016) (“A law-applying institution
cannot announce a wholly new rule, not derived from existing law . . . ..”). For an
overview of the principal rationales for separating judicial functions (adjudication)
from legislative functions (policymaking), see Edward McWhinney, The Supreme
Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-Making, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837 (1955).
65. Jonathan E. Maddison, Why Wayfair Won’t Matter: Supreme Court Raises
‘Substantial Nexus’ Controversy in Internet Age, Capturing Attention of Tax
Specialists—and
the
Public
TAX EXECUTIVE
(May 31, 2018),
http://taxexecutive.org/why-wayfair-wont-matter/.
66. The Court noted that the tax at issue applied only to merchants that deliver
more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or
more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into South Dakota
each year. “This quantity of business,” the Court declared, “could not have occurred
unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in
South Dakota.” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2009.
67. For example, the Court suggested that evidence that out-of-state merchants
“are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual
presence” might support a finding of purposeful availment. Id.
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connection with a single sale, or if another kind of circumstantial
evidence supports an inference of purposeful availment in connection
with a single sale, nothing in Wayfair precludes a finding that a single
sale may furnish a sufficient nexus for purposes of a state’s authority
to impose a use tax obligation.
B. Due Process
For Commerce Clause purposes, the relevant question is whether
a tax discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce, not
whether it is fair or unfair to a particular individual.68 The Wayfair
Court blurred this distinction somewhat by deeming it essential to
Commerce Clause analysis to decide whether taxpayers had
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in
the taxing state or not.69 Purposeful availment is relevant to fairness
to an individual; it is a Due Process concept.70
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
interpreted to mean, among other things, that a state’s regulatory
power extends only to its territorial boundaries. 71 State power over
property may be predicated on the presence of the property within the
state (in rem jurisdiction). State power over a person may be
68. Id. at 2092.
69. “Wayfair’s holding undoes some of Quill’s precision and again blurs the
distinction between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause as they apply
to interstate taxation.” Alston & Bird, Thanks for the Memories, Quill: The Supreme
Court Adopts a New Nexus Standard for Use Tax Collection, JDSUPRA (June 25,
2018), https://www.idsupra.com/legalnews/thanks-for-the memories-quill-the88517/. The Court cited Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)
for the proposition that “nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails
itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in the jurisdiction.”
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. Polar Tankers, however, was a case interpreting the
Tonnage Clause; it addressed neither Commerce Clause nor Due Process issues.
Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 6. Moreover, the Polar Tankers Court cited Quill in
support of the quoted proposition. Id. at 11. Ironically, Quill had carefully
distinguished between Due Process nexus, which is concerned with fairness to the
individual, and Commerce Clause nexus, which is “informed not so much by
concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about
the effects of state regulation on the national economy.” Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
70. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985);
Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958).
71. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (suggesting that extraterritorial
regulation would be an abuse of power).
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predicated on the presence of the person within the state (in personam
jurisdiction). A state generally lacks jurisdiction, however, over nonresidents who have no property in the state.72
While this principle is easy to state, it is difficult to apply to
business entities. Corporations and certain other business entities are
juridical “persons,”73 but they do not have a physical existence. Courts
initially treated them as if they had a physical presence in the state of
incorporation.74 Because corporate activity often extended beyond the
boundaries of the state of incorporation, however, courts adopted
alternative theories for the exercise of power over out-of-state
business entities.75 One of these was consent. Relying on the principle
that consent is an independent basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, courts reasoned that when a state’s permission is needed
for a foreign corporation to do business in the state, the foreign
corporation implicitly consents to the state’s exercise of jurisdiction
over the business transactions the corporation conducts within the
state. 76 Under the agency theory, the presence of a human being
conducting business on the corporation’s behalf within the state may
establish the corporation’s physical presence in the state.77 Because
the act of transacting business within a state is the deciding factor
under either theory, they came to be subsumed under the general
theory that a state has jurisdiction over any company that is “doing
business” in the state.78
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 79 eliminated the consent
and physical presence requirements altogether.
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the
72. Id. at 722, 724.
73. See, e.g., Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Christine
M. Kailus, Diversity Jurisdiction and Unincorporated Businesses: Collapsing the
Doctrinal Wall, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1543, 1545.
74. “[T]he corporation . . . dwell[s] in the place of its creation.” Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). “[I]t must live and have its
being in that state . . . .” Id.
75. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882).
76. Id. at 356; Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407–
8 (1855).
77. Int’l Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 586 (1914).
78. Gary W. Westerberg, Case Note, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 346, 347 (1970).
79. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”80
This rule, known as the “minimum contacts” test, means that a
state may exercise power over a business that has no physical presence
if the business has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State” such that the business
“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”81 In the
sales and use tax context, “due process requires some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property
or transaction it seeks to tax.”82
It was established very early on that the connection (“nexus”) the
Due Process Clause mandates does not require physical presence.83
Bellas Hess seemed to mark a retreat from this position. This case
involved Due Process and Commerce Clause challenges to the
constitutionality of state taxes on sales by an out-of-state mail-order
company to residents of the state.84 The company’s only contacts with
the state were by mail and common carrier; it had no physical presence
there.85 Asserting that analysis of the issues under the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses is essentially the same,86 the Court held that
the imposition of tax obligations on a mail-order company is
unconstitutional when the company’s only contacts with the state are
by mail and common carrier. 87 The Court insisted that a “sharp
distinction” must be maintained between mail-order companies with
retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State and those that “do
no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or
common carrier as part of a general interstate business.”88 Because the
Court did not distinguish between the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses in reaching its decision, the case seemed to stand for the
80. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
81. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
82. Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954).
83. See, e.g., Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (holding that a
company’s use of sales solicitors in another state may support tax jurisdiction over
a company even if the solicitors are independent contractors and not agents or
employees of the company).
84. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
85. Id. at 754.
86. Id. at 756.
87. Id. at 758, 760.
88. Id. at 758.
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proposition that both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses require
some sort of physical presence in the state in order to support a state’s
imposition of sales or use tax obligations.
In Quill, the Court acknowledged that it had erroneously conflated
Due Process and Commerce Clause analysis in Bellas Hess.89 While
reaffirming the holding in Bellas Hess to the extent it rested on the
Commerce Clause, the Court overruled it to the extent it rested on the
Due Process clause. 90 Quill Corp. was a mail- and phone-order
marketer of office and business supplies whose only contacts with the
state of North Dakota were by mail and common carrier. Like
National Bellas Hess, Quill Corp. argued that a state could not
constitutionally impose taxes on sales to residents that are made by a
mail-order company with no physical presence there. The North
Dakota Supreme Court sustained the tax, holding that Bellas Hess had
become obsolete.91 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The
Court clarified that there is no Due Process Clause violation if the
business sought to be taxed has had minimum contacts with the state
such that the imposition of the tax does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. 92 So long as a company’s sales
efforts are purposefully directed toward residents of a state, physical
presence in the state is not necessary insofar as the Due Process Clause
is concerned. 93 Irrespective of physical presence, a business that
purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in
another state has “fair warning that a particular activity may subject
[it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”94 Consequently, there
is nothing unfair about imposing tax obligations on an out-of-state
seller that “purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic
market in the forum State.”95
In the absence of physical presence or consent, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state company with respect to a
claim that is unrelated to the company’s contacts with the state unless
the company has continuous or systematic contacts with the state.96
89. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (“The two
constitutional requirements differ fundamentally.”).
90. Id. at 308, 314, 317–18..
91. Id. at 303–4, 310.
92. Id. at 307.
93. Id. at 308; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985).
94. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
96. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011).
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This may be the source of the idea that systematic and/or continuous
contacts with a state are essential to a state’s Due Process authority to
impose a sales or use tax on an out-of-state merchant. It must be kept
in mind, however, that contacts only need to be “continuous or
systematic” when the claim in question is unrelated to the contact with
the state upon which jurisdiction is predicated.97 If contact with the
state is continuous and systematic, then a court may exercise
jurisdiction whether the claim relates to or arises out of a particular
contact or not. 98 An exercise of jurisdiction may nevertheless be
appropriate, however, even if a company’s contacts with the state are
not continuous and systematic. The fact that the claim in question in
a particular case relates to or arises out of a contact the company has
had with the state may suffice. Sometimes even a single contact may
suffice if it is related to the claim that is being asserted against the
company. 99 When a state only seeks to impose tax obligations for
sales to which the tax directly relates, the state’s exercise of
jurisdiction is directly related to the contact with the state. Since there
is a direct connection between a sale and a tax on the same sale, proof
of continuous or systematic contacts with the state should not be
necessary. The sale to which the tax relates is the minimum contact
that provides the necessary Due Process nexus.
The rationale for the “purposeful availment” principle is that if a
merchant knowingly and intentionally sells a product or service to a
resident of a different state, then it should come as no surprise if the
taxing authority in that state requires out-of-state merchants to collect
and remit the same tax on the sale that a local merchant is required to
collect and remit. There is nothing unfair about requiring interstate

97. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 414, 414–16 (1984)
(requiring “continuous and systematic” contacts where the parties had conceded that
the case did not arise out of and was not related to contacts with the forum state).
98. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445–46 (19523).
This is known as general jurisdiction. Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81.
99. McGee, 355 U.S. 220; cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)
(upholding a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident individual who was
involved in an automobile accident while driving on the state’s roads, where the
claim arose out of the accident). This is known as specific jurisdiction. See Arthur
T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1148 (1966); see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
414–16.
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commerce to pay its fair share of taxes.100
Unless a merchant has a physical presence in the taxing state or
has consented to the state’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Due Process
issue in sales and use tax cases is whether the merchant intended to
direct a sale to a resident of the state. If so, then a Due Process nexus
exists.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF VOLUME THRESHOLDS
Declaring the existence of constitutionally mandated volume
thresholds, revenue thresholds, or both, without specifying what they
are is problematic. How are courts to decide what volume or dollar
amount is the appropriate threshold? South Dakota selected $100,000
or 200 sales, but another state might specify $20,000 and 100 sales,
$1,000 and 90 sales, $100 and 10 sales, or $10 and 1 sale. Without a
foundation in principle, the economic nexus test is entirely arbitrary.
The rationale for volume thresholds is that requiring small
businesses to comply with multiple state tax obligations would be
burdensome. 101 There are roughly 10,000 sales and use tax
jurisdictions in the United States, each with the capacity to specify its
own tax base and rate. 102 Complying with all of these regulations
would be burdensome. That much is obvious. The more difficult
question is whether it would be unduly so.
To be grounded in the Commerce Clause, the term undue needs to
be construed with reference to its purpose, namely, to prevent states
from either discriminating against interstate commerce or enacting
laws that have the effect of favoring intrastate commerce over
interstate commerce. 103 Every tax is a burden on taxpayers. The
burden is of constitutional significance only if it is heavier for
merchants engaged in interstate commerce than for local
merchants.104
100. D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988); see also
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mont., 453 U.S. 609, 623 (1981) (“It was not the
purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from their just share of [the] state tax burden.”)
101. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2103 (2018) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
102. Id.
103. See discussion supra Part II.A.
104. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (majority opinion) (“[S]ince in-state businesses
pay the taxes as well, the risk of discrimination against out-of-state sellers is
avoided.”) A state law violates the Commerce Clause if it mandates “differential
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Complying with multiple tax obligations can be as burdensome
for wholly intrastate businesses as for interstate businesses. The
10,000 taxing jurisdictions in which merchants are potentially subject
to collection and remittance obligations are not evenly distributed
throughout the country. Iowa, for example, is a destination-based sales
tax state 105 with 994 different sales tax jurisdictions. 106 Both the
interstate and the wholly intrastate state merchant may potentially
need to comply with 994 sets of tax regulations. If they both make the
same kinds of sales to the same customers in the same parts of the
state, their compliance burdens will be identical, regardless of whether
they each make 200 sales and earn revenues of $100,000 or they make
only one $1 sale. Volume of sales or revenue is no better proxy for the
burden of compliance than physical presence.
Moreover, limiting economic nexus to companies with the
requisite “large” volume of sales and/or revenue from sales in a state
will still give many interstate merchants a competitive advantage over
local merchants. To see this, consider the following scenario (assume
Wyoming has established volume/revenue thresholds like South
Dakota’s):
For years Bob, a Wyoming retailer, has made a living
selling lawn tractors out of his store to Wyoming
residents. He charges $2,000 plus $50 shipping and
$150 sales tax, for a total of $2,200. This year, several
dozen out-of-state companies established internet
websites where they offer the same tractor for the same
price but without charging sales or use taxes to
Wyoming residents. Presented with an opportunity to
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter.” Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988). “The mere
fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to
markets in other States.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005); see also
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
105. Destination sales taxes are taxes that are calculated at the rate in effect in
the jurisdiction whether the buyer is located. Origin sales taxes are calculated at the
rate in effect where the seller is located. Mark Faggiano, Origin-Based and
Destination-Based Sales Tax Collection 101, TAXJAR (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://blog.taxjar.com/charging-sales-tax-rates/
106. Joseph Bishop-Henchman & Richard Borean, State Sales Tax Jurisdictions
Approach
10,000,
TAX
FOUNDATION
(Mar.
24,
2014),
https://taxfoundation.org/state-sales-tax-jurisdictions-approach-10000.
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save $150, every person in Wyoming who buys a lawn
tractor this year purchases it online and not from Bob.
Although Wyoming residents bought hundreds of lawn
tractors this year, no single online retailer sold more
than 100 tractors or earned more than $100,000 from
sales to Wyoming residents. Not having individually
met the state’s “high volume or revenue” use tax
thresholds, none of these businesses needs to collect
and remit any taxes on these sales. Meanwhile Bob,
having made no sales due to the ability of online
retailers to undersell him by virtue of being taxexempt, goes out of business.
Just as the physical presence requirement puts intrastate merchants
at a competitive disadvantage, so volume- and revenue-thresholds for
use tax liability put intrastate merchants at a competitive
disadvantage.
In his dissenting opinion in Bellas Hess, Justice Fortas suggested
that “large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation”
of a consumer market furnishes the requisite economic nexus to justify
the imposition of tax obligations on out-of-state retailers.107 As has
been shown, large sales volume is a poor proxy for the compliance
burden. “Systematic” and “continuous” are not any better. An
individual who makes a single multi-million-dollar sale to a resident
of a state could not be said to be engaged in “systematic and
continuous” sales in the state, yet requiring the collection of sales or
use tax on this sale would be no more burdensome for the merchant
than it would be for a local merchant. “Solicitation” should not suffice
as a basis for imposing a tax, either.108 The only term Justice Fortas
mentioned that might possibly suffice is “exploitation.”109
Exploit can mean different things. It can mean “to make use of
meanly or unfairly for one's own advantage.”110 Of course, a person’s
107. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S., 753, 761–62 (1967)
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
108. Cf. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (establishing a sliding scale for Due Process nexus purposes, with
websites that merely solicit customers through advertising having no nexus with the
state, and those that are used for actually conducting business, such as entering into
a sales contract, having a nexus).
109. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
110. Exploit, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merrianwebster.com/dictionary/exploit (last visited October 23, 2019).
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mean or selfish disposition does not provide a constitutional basis for
state tax powers. If it did, then every taxing authority in the country
would have constitutional authority to tax people in every state
irrespective of any retailer’s physical presence or transaction of
business there. Exploit can also refer to making productive use of
something. 111 Making use of a market means using the market to
acquire value. A business that makes productive use of a market is
availing itself of the privilege of carrying on business in the market.
That is the relevant nexus.112
It is well established that a sale has a sufficient nexus with the state
in which it occurs to be taxable by that state.113 Provided it does not
result in multiple taxation, a tax may be imposed even if the seller is
located outside the state.114 “It [is] not the purpose of the commerce
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just
share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the
business.”115
High sales or revenue volume is a poor proxy, as well, for the
“purposeful availment” the Due Process Clause requires when a
merchant neither consents to jurisdiction nor has any physical
presence in a state. A vendor that uses an online marketplace to sell
products might intend to sell only to residents of the state in which the
vendor is located. It might even display a notice on its web page that
sales are restricted exclusively to residents of the vendor’s state. If the
vendor is selling digital downloads, neither the vendor nor the online
marketplace provider may ever know which states the computers onto
which files are downloaded are located. In these circumstances, it
would make no difference whether the vendor sold thousands of
downloads or only one. In neither case would a sale have been
knowingly or intentionally made to a buyer in a particular state.
111. Id.
112. A “nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of
Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)).
113. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995);
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (rejecting the
claim that the “mere formation of the contract between persons in different states”
is not sufficient for purposes of tax nexus); see also 2 C. TROST & P. HARTMAN,
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 2d § 11:1, p. 471 (2003)
(“Generally speaking, a sale is attributable to its destination.”)
114. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254.
115. Id.
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Meanwhile, a vendor who makes only one sale, a $99,999 item that
he sells to a buyer whom he knows resides in a particular state, is
knowingly and intentionally availing himself of the consumer market
in that state despite the fact that the sale is below a “$100,000 or 200
sales” threshold. High sales/revenue volume is no better proxy for
purposeful availment than it is for the compliance burden.
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Of course, there can be no real doubt that sales and use taxes
burden both interstate and intrastate commerce. There can also be
little doubt that the prospect of multiple use tax obligations in multiple
jurisdictions, all of which determine their own bases and rates, may
deter companies from conducting sales in more than a handful of
jurisdictions. If physical presence and volume thresholds are not
viable limitations on state power to tax interstate sales, then what can
be done to foster interstate commerce without at the same time
disadvantaging wholly intrastate businesses?
A. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
After Quill was decided, the National Governor’s Association and
the National Conference of State Legislatures created a Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Project. The goal was to simplify state sales and
use tax collection to reduce the burden on interstate commerce. The
result of this work was the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
(SSUTA).116 Among other things, the SSUTA calls for participating
states to administer state and local taxes at the state level, rather than
requiring businesses to remit taxes to individual local taxing
jurisdictions. 117 It also attempts to standardize state and local tax
bases, rates, and definitions, in order to engender more uniformity
among state and local tax laws.118 Simplified administration, returns,
remittance and other procedures are also part of the program.119
A downside to the SSUTA is that it does not prevent states from
adopting volume and/or revenue thresholds. As has been seen, these
116. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., STATE GUIDE TO THE
STREAMLINED
SALES
TAX
PROJECT
3
(2019),
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/guides/state-guide-tostreamlined-sales-tax-project-2019-03-01.pdf,
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id. at 5–6.
119. Id.
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features can produce inequitable results and they continue to put local
businesses at a competitive disadvantage relative to interstate
merchants. Further, allowing states to define their own volume and
revenue thresholds increases the complexity of the matrix of state and
local sales and use taxes. This is not consistent with the goals of
simplification and uniformity.
A more fundamental drawback to the SSUTA is that it is entirely
voluntary. However commendable its objectives may be, the success
of the program depends entirely on voluntary state cooperation. To
date, only twenty-four states are full SSUTA members.120 The top six
sales tax collection states by population—California, Florida, Illinois,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas—have not signed on.121
B. Federal Legislation
Congress may enact legislation regulating interstate commerce,
and where it has done so, the legislation controls.122 So long as it does
not overstep Due Process limitations, Congress may at any time
replace judicially created rules regulating interstate commerce with
rules of its own making.123 With that in mind, several proposals for
congressional legislation have been advanced since Wayfair to lessen
the burden of multiple state and local sales and use tax obligations on
interstate commerce.
1. Restoring the Physical Presence Requirement
One way to lighten the burden on interstate merchants would be
to reinstate the physical presence requirement. Congress could
legislatively overrule Wayfair. This is the objective of a pending bill
for a Stop Taxing Our Potential Act.124 Next to leaving states with
revenue shortfalls, the most significant drawback to this approach is
that it would return wholly intrastate businesses to their position of
competitive disadvantage relative to interstate merchants.

120. See State Information, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD.,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/Shared-Pages/State-Detail.(last
visited
October 26, 2019).
121. Id.
122. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945).
123. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 424–25 (1946)
124. S. 128, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019).
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2. Small Business Exemption
Another approach that Congress could take would be to federalize
volume thresholds. H.R. 6824125 was an example of this approach. It
would have prohibited states from imposing tax collection obligations
on out-of-state sellers with under $10 million gross annual revenues
until the states enter into a congressionally approved sales and use tax
compact.
Any legislation establishing volume thresholds, of course, will be
vulnerable to a Due Process challenge unless it excludes the
possibility that tax collection obligations may be imposed on vendors
who have not purposefully availed themselves of a consumer market
in the taxing jurisdiction. Accordingly, the legislation should address
the phenomenon of vendors selling digital downloads through an
automated third-party online marketplace provider. 126 Even if the
legislation is drafted in a way that addresses that concern, a federally
imposed volume threshold will still yield the same inequities that
state-imposed volume thresholds do. 127 Moreover, setting the
threshold at $10 million will put wholly intrastate businesses at a
competitive disadvantage relative to all but a few interstate
businesses.
3. Retroactive Enforcement
Several bills prohibiting retroactive enforcement of sales and use
taxes against businesses lacking a physical presence in a state have
been introduced.128 So far, none have been passed.
4. Simplification, Centralization, Uniformity
One promising approach is to require states that wish to impose
tax collection obligations on out-of-state merchants to enact
simplified, uniform sales and use tax laws that provide for centralized
collection. The proposed Protecting Businesses from Burdensome
Compliance Costs Act of 2019129 is an example. It would prohibit a
125. 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018); see also S.B. 3725, 115th Cong. (2018),
which also would have established an exemption for remote sellers with less than
$10 million gross annual revenues.
126. See discussion supra Part II.B.
127. See discussion supra Part III.
128. See, e.g., Protecting Businesses from Burdensome Compliance Cost Act of
2018, H.R. 6724, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2018).
129. H.R. 369, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. (2019).
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state from imposing a tax collection obligation on a remote seller that
lacks a physical presence in the state unless the state has established a
uniform sales tax rate and a centralized collections system.130 Local
taxes, if any, would need to be collected through the state’s centralized
collections system, as opposed to requiring remote sellers to remit
payments to each of the potentially thousands of local taxing
jurisdictions individually.131 The state sales and use tax rate would be
uniform throughout the state, and the combined state and local tax
would be the same for both remote and local sellers.132
Because it does not simply call for reinstating the physical
presence requirement, and does not impose volume or revenue
thresholds, this bill is fairer to local businesses and better serves state
revenue-raising interests than other proposals. The requirement of
centralized collection and disbursement of state and local taxes should
benefit both interstate and wholly intrastate businesses, without
operating to the advantage or disadvantage of either.
The bill could be improved by requiring states to make available
a free software program, or at least a publicly accessible web page
merchants and/or buyers could use to calculate sales or use tax at the
time of sale. Ideally the web page or program would correlate a
purchaser’s zip code to the appropriate state and local sales tax rate on
the purchase. This would involve some cost. The costs, however,
would be offset, in whole or at least in part, by increased compliance
with sales and use tax collection and remittance obligations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Commerce Clause generally should not present an obstacle to
a state’s imposition of the same sales or use tax obligations on out-ofstate merchants as are imposed on wholly intrastate merchants. It
should only be a problem if an out-of-state seller would incur greater
compliance costs than an intrastate seller would incur for the same
number, amount and kinds of sales in the state. Whether a merchant
has low or high sales volume or revenues, a sufficient nexus may exist
for the imposition of a tax collection obligation if a merchant has
purposefully availed itself of the consumer market in that state by
knowingly or intentionally making an actual sale to a resident of the
state.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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Neither physical presence nor high sales volume or revenue
thresholds are adequate proxies for either purposeful availment or
substantial nexus. The time is ripe for Congress to exercise its
Commerce Clause power to ameliorate the burden on commerce that
state and local sales and use taxes impose. Proposals to legislatively
overrule Wayfair by reinstating the physical presence requirement, or
to establish a national volume threshold, are unsound. Federal
legislation mandating simplicity, centralization of administration and
collection, and greater uniformity is a more promising approach.
Coupled with accessible tax calculation software or web-based
resources keyed to zip codes, this approach would accommodate state
revenue interests while facilitating commerce in a way that does not
disadvantage either interstate or intrastate commerce, thereby coming
closer to realizing the Founders’ vision of a coalition of individual
states working together as one nation.
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